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Abstract
In this paper wc study thc impact of deni:rnd dispersals on the equilibrium
outcorne in a two-dimensional spatial location model with two firms. 'I'he
corresponding location t.hen-price game is solved by backwards induction.
til.:rnd:rnl r,pl.iiniza.f.iou t~~r hniyn~,v hnwrwr,r :r.rr~ nul. a.pplica.blr, rlu~~ lo thr,
nun ynasi ronr:wity r,l Lhr~ prulil, fnncl.iuns. ('andidatr, equilibria for I,hc~
'overall gamc' (referred to as global cyuilibria) can be found however by
restricting the firms' strategies as to end up in a specific demand re~ion.
l~rom t,he set of local equilibria it is possible then to determine the (unique)
~lobal eyuilibriutn. [n eyuilibriunr firms' locations and prices are such thaL
both firms Cace cyual demands and have equal proíits.
Keywords: location theory, demand dispersals, equilibrium.
Introduction
Sp~tit.ial co~npetition thecrry, based on líotelling's (19`L9) well-known paper,
in some sense has not evolved much since then. A}though it is possible to
list, rnany papers on this subjec.t very little has been written on the distribu-
tion of c.onsumers. The main assurnption is that consumers are uniforrnely
distributed along a line segment. The only paper that we are aware of that
has dealt with non-uniformly distributed consumers and a two-dimensional
space analytically is the one of Lederer and Hurter (1986).
The main criticism to their model is that their approach is based on the
assumption of discriminatory pricing. There is no clear reason for doing this,
}~~~t, t,}~c. result,s will bc quitc diffcmnt, if wc rnake the assumpt,ion of mill pricing
(i.e. transport,ation costs are not included) as was shown by Gabszewicz and
'I'hisse (1986). Eisselt (1991) moreover studies the situation whcre one of the
firrns uses discriminatory pricing and the other firm uses mill pricing.
Although t,here is not much evidence of which pricing policy to be used,
wc would argue t,hat a mill pricing policy is rnuch more of practical intere.st,
than a discriminatory pricing policy. An important reason for firms not being
ablc to price discriminate is that they are unable (or perhaps unwilling) to
c.ustomise the product to the individual consumer's desires (see al-Nowaihi
and Norman (1992)). Mill pricing consequently leads to sales maximization,
whereas discriminatory pricing leads to minimization of transportation cost
(see Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986)).
Our approach to model non-uniformly distributed consurners wil} there-
fore be based on the assumption of mill-pricing. The main problem with
conrpetitive location models is that they are often too complex to deal with
analytically. In this paper we restrict ourselves to a situation where two
firms are located along a single line. The situation with m firms in a two-
dimensional space rernains future research.
In this paper we study the situation in which consumers are distributed
piecewise uniformly. Essent,ially there are two reasons for representing de-
mand dispersals in this way. The first reason is that we want to model a
broad class of demand functions, without requiring concavity, and the sec-
ond reason is that the data available for practical applications usually is of
t,his kind (think of density per metres square for example).
The determination of all possible location-price equilibria is done in the
spirit of Hotelling's approach. First the firms choose their locations and after
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t,ha.t. t.hc finns c~huosc~ thc~ir pricc~s, givcn t.hc locations. '1'hc correspouding
t~~-u-st.agc~ ga.nu~ iv sulvc~d ihc~n by ha.ckwards inducl,ion~.
'1'he basic problem in gcncral is Lhat thc profit, funct,ions of thc Iirrns
are not different,iablc everywherc~ due t,o thc fact that dernand is kinked. It
seems however t,hat t,here is little difference with the situation where demand
is defined as a uniform distribution, in whic.h case it is obvious that there is
a unique indiíferettt consumer. Int,uitively we expect the same for a situation
where demand is defined as a piecewise uniform distribution. Because the
exact location of the indifferent consumer is determined completely by the
location choices and the price policies of the firm, it is a hard task to maximize
(irrns' profits direct,ly. 'I'he main reason for this is the (in general) non-quasi-
concavity of the (irrn's profit function (see Gabszewicz and 'I'hisse (1986)). In
a cornpanion papc~r wc sl,udy the profit frmction morc rigorously (see Webers
(1993a)).
[n this paper we try to overcome the dif}iculties arising from the non-
quasi-concavity of thc profit functions by using thc following two-step analy-
sis. I'irst wc dctc~rrninc a solution for thc situation whcrc thc location of thc
indifferent consumer is restricted to one of the subintcrvals oí the line seg-
ment. This is possible with standard first order techniques because the profit
function is piecewise quasi-concave. A solution to the overall maximization
problern can be found then from the solutions for these subintervals. We will
show t,hat the firms' location and price choices are such that both firms face
the same demancí in e,quilibrium. )Jach firm's location and price choice is in
other words det,ermined cornplet,ely by the demand distribution. We thereby
assumc~ that both firrns are in thc~ markct..
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 wc present the rnodel.
In Section 2 we define the equilibrium concept. In Section 3 and Section
4 we characterize the equilibrium and give some equilibrium properties. In
Sc;ction 5 we present a slightly rnodified model in which the locations of the
(irnis arc rest,rictcd and in Sect,iun fi wc concludc.
~Anderson, de 1'alrna and llong (199'l) compared Lhe simultaneous price and location
game with the two-stage location-then-price game and suggest that equilibrium locations
are further apart under the second game and that profits are higher then, since firms
internalize the harmful price competition effect of moving close to each other. However
they note that if prices are less costly to adjust than locations, then a two-stage location-
Lhen-price game is deemed the relevant equilibrium concept, as wa.g also suggested hy
'I'irolc (19R8) for c~xamplc.
.~
1 The model
~~'v~ ~ uiisicl,~r ~r. niarkc~l. r,~t;iun clc~ti~~rib,~cl b~- Lhc~ int.c~rva.l M-[O, re] in R~, fur
sonic positivc intcger ~rz. In the econoniy thcrc are two types of agents, selle~rs
and buyers. We assume that there are t.wo sellers in the market. 'I'hese
scllers, which wc will also refcr to as firrns, produce the same, singlc good
with unit production costs c. 'I'he buyers, the consumers, are characterized
by their location along t,he line segment M. 'I'he consumers have identical
preferences and wish to purchase a single unit of the good. The implicit
assurnption made here is that the consumers have an infinite willingness to
pay.
In contrast to most of the existing literature on spatial compet,ition wc
allow for geographical dernand dispersals, i.e. consumers are not necessarily
distributed uniforrnly along thc line segrnent. The distribut,ion of the con-
surners along Lhc line segrnent is modcled in the following way. On cach
interval [i, i~} 1] with i E {0, . .. , n- l} consumers are located with density
d;fi ) 0 such that
n-1
~ ~~stl - I.
i-U
'The demand distribution will be denoted by the tuple C dr, d2i ..., dn )
with ra E N. Note that we have the standard uniform case when rz- 1 or
d;~, - l~n for each i E{0, ..., n- 1}. The requirement that d;~r ) 0 for
each i is nceded to side step the difFiculties arising when firm 1 strives to get
t.he consurner located at i and firm Z strives to get the consurner located at
i~ 1. 'Chc locations that firm 1 and firm 'l choose will bc denotcd by a and h,
respectively, and their prices by pi and ~l. We will allow for location choices
outside the interval M and refer to this situation as 'locations outside the
city'. As Tirole (1988) already noted the possibilities for horizontal differen-
tiation will be greater then. Furthermore this assumption avoids technical
'corner' difficulties as in the original Hotelling model, as was noted by Salop
(1979) among others.
The optimal locations of the firnrs are determined by two effects, a direct
effect and a strategic effect. With the direct effect we mean that a location
t.haL is rnore close t.o the centrc Ic,ads to a grcater rnarket sharc and therefore
hi~;h~~r t,rofits fur a fixc~d pri,e. Wi1.h I,hc stratcgic cffcca wc rncan t,hal, Lhc
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price contpet,it,ion is higher whe~n the finna are closer to each other. 'Che
outcornc~ of t,hc~ t ra.dc~-o(f be,twc~en I,hc~ posit,ivc~ and negative elfect. of clustering
is not c lca.r in gc~nera.l.
'I'he transportation cost, Lhe consumers will }rave to pay are a.gsumed to
bc yuadratic. As cl'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) show, this
assumpt,ion ensures the existence of a price e,quilibrium (when demand is
dist.ributed uniformly), whatever the locations a and 6 may be, because this
assumption prevent,s discontinuities in the profit functionz. Anderson (1988)
stnclics I,hc cxistcnce of equilibria for the nrore general case t,hat transporta-
Liun cosls arc 'lincar-yuadral.ic', i.e, a yuadratic function forrn rcpresentation
(wit,h a constant, tcrrn cqual Lo 0). It is shown that thc pararnctcrs of thc
yuadratic and t.he linear term havc to satisfy very stringent conditions in
orcler to sustain an cquilibrium.
'I'he (inal assumption we make is that a G b, i.e. firm 1 locates to the
Ic~ft uf (irnt 2. ~Vc~ thus ignorc~ t.hc~ cii(fic~ultic~s arising from t,hc coordination
pruhlc~nr thc~ firnrs face. I~'or a clc~tailc~cl discussion on I,his problenr sec 13ester,
dc I'alrna, Leiningcr, von 'I'hadden and 'l'homas (1991). '1'hcre it is shown
that there will be less differentiation in such a case, due to the fact that each
firm has a posit,ive probability of cndíng up "le,ft to the middle".
"I'he indifferent consurner, i.e. the consumer indifferent between buying
from firm 1 and buying from firm 2, is located at ~ equal to
z a b, a } b Pz - Pr( , Pr,Pz)- 2 ~2(b-a),
(1)
given the location a of firm 1, the location b of firm 2, the price pr of firm 1
ancí the price pz of firm 2. We assume that 0 G ~(a, b, pr, pz) G n and that
in equilibrium both firms are in t:he rnarket. - -
If hoth firrns anticipate that the indifferent c.onsurner will be located in
thc interval [i, i-}- 1] (due to their strategies) then the (anticipated) dernand
of firrn 1 can bc wril.ten as
~i(a, b,Pr,7~z) - (do f... ~ dt) f d;fr(~(a,b,Pr,Pz) - z)
~Another way to restore equilibriurn (sec for examplc Lerncr and Singcr (1937)) is to
assurne that. firrns arr` unable to cut their rivals' prices (frr`quently called Lhe no-mill-prico
undercutting restriction). 'l~he shortcoming of t.his procedure howevrr is Lhat one of lhr
basic (and probably most important) íngredients of price competition ia elirninatecl.
~
and t.hc (anticipated) dernand of firrn 2 can be written as
Dá(a,b,Pr,Pz) - I - Di(a,b,Pr,Pz)
with do - 0. Eor simplicity we de.note D; - do ~-..-F d;. 'I'he costs c are
normalized t.o zcro. Given a, b, p~, pz and i the (anticipat,ed) profits of firm k
with k E{1,2} arc lf~(a,b,7ri,Pz) -7rk7~k(a,b,Pi,Pz).
2 The equilibrium concept
'I'u sLudy t,hc~ bchaviour of thc firrns with respcc.t, to thcir location choiccs and
1,hcir pricc policics wc considcr Lhc following two-st,age garnc wit,h cornplctc
information. In the first, stage firms choose locations, afterwards they becorne
aware of these locat,ions. In the second st,age [irms choose prices (and receive
pro(it,s). As in Shaked and Sutt.on (1982) and Lederer and Hurter (1986)
the set of Nash equilibria for this game is very large and vcry difficult to
characterize. We use the perfect equilibrium notion of Selten (1975). In our
set.t,ing a tuple of strategies is a perfect, equilibrium if the price strategies
in the second st.age oE the game form a Nash equilibrium and t,he location
stra.tegics in the first stage of the game form a Nash equilibrium, given these
cquilibrium price schcmes. '1'hc conccpt of pcrfec,t equilibrium captures thc
idea Lhat, when firms choose their locations, thcy explicitly take the impact
of their locat,ion decisions on prices into account.
It can be shown that there will exist only a perfect equilibrium when
bot.h firms coordinate on the same interval. This is c,aused by the fact that
in equilibrium both firms face the same indifferent consumer. When both
firms do not coordinate on the same interval of M, then either no pric.e
equilibriurn exists or one of t,he. firrns anticipates t,he indifferent consumer to
lic in onc intcrval and t,hc othcr firrn anl,icipatcs t,hc indi(fcrenl. consiirncr to
lic in thc ncxt intcrval. l~s a conscqucnc~c t.hc indi(fcrcnL consurncr will hc
locatcd at Lhc comnion cndpoint. 'I'hcn a price cquilibriutn cxists but onc
of the firrns can increase (or keep) its profits by coordinating on the sarne
intcrval as its opponent,.
'fhc~refore we assurne t,hat both fir~ns a.nt.icipate 1,hat the indifferent con-
sunu~r is loc.ated in sa.y I,hc ir~` intc,rvaJ of ~ll, i.c~. i G.T(a, b, p~,7r1) C i~ 1. Wc
refcr Lo Lhc cornpc,tcl,ivc ganic whc~rc~ Lhe indi(ferenL consutnc,r is r~.5sutned to
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bc~ located in thc ith interval as I''. r1 meaningful noncooperative solution for
t,h~~ lor~~it.ion-thc~u pricc~ ganie is t,he local location-price equilibrium concept,,
which in fact is t,he perfect equilibriurn concept for the (restricted) game I".
l~.ccall t,hat a G b by assumption.
I)t~(inil.iun 2.I .~1 lnr'rtl lnrvclxnn-hlzr'r rr~aclzh'I'r.tz1rl ~hhl'I';) firr thr yrcrrrr I"
is~ o, y~iiadruqrlc G a',b", pi (a, b), p.z(a, h) ~ sur.h lhat il is a perfcr,l equilibrium
for l'', i.c.
( i) p~ (a, b) and p2(a, b) is a Nash equilibrium in the second stage of the
game for all a and b
(ii) a' and b' is a Nash eqrzilibriunz in the firsl stage of lhe game yiven lhe
pricc sclzerit.es in the secon.d .titage.
Our purpose now is to determine frorn the set of local equilibria a glohal
equilibrium for t,he 'overall' game which we will refer to as I'. Note that the
local equilibrium concept is very strong, in the sense that optimal behaviour
with respect to location choices and price policies is possibly restricted by
the assumed location of the indifferent consumer. In a global equilibrium
however, location choices and price policies will be reached without restricting
cither of the two firms. As we will see the perfectness condition (ii) requires
t,he price policies to be unrestricted. For a global equilibrium we therefore
need that the prices and the locat,ions of an LLPE are chosen frc~ely, i.e. not
restric.ted by the boundary conditions, in one of the intervals. We call this
an unconst,rained LLPF:. Wit,h t,his notion we can define a noncooperative
solution for the location-then-price game I'.
Definition 2.2 A global location-price equilibrium (GLPE~ for the game I'
i.s a quadruple G a', b', pr(a, b), pz(a, 6) ~ such that
(i) this quadruple is an unconstrained L,LPE with respe.ct t0 some I'' with
i E {0,...,n- 1}
(ii) for both firms profïts are maximized over all unconstrained LLI'F,s.
It will be shown that there is at least one and at most two unconstrained
LLPEs. In case of two unconstrained LLPEs these equilibria are paired, i.e.
the resulting indifferent consumer is the same. For both firms profits are
highest if they coordinate on the interval with the lowest demand density,
which means that there will be a imique GLPE.
fi
3 Characterization of local equilibria
Iri inaxirnizin~; firolit.s ( irniti rlrousr: locations in the ( irst st,agc ancl price poli-
c~icw in t.hc scconcl stagc that arc~ optirnal in the sensc of Nash, given thcir
expecf.ations with respect to clema.nd. Let i E {0, ..., rt - ]} be fixed. '1'he
two-stage game I" is solved then by backwards induction. In the second
stagc of t.hc gamc both (irrns rnaxinrize profits with respect to thcir own
firic~~~ (,e;ive,n t.hc~ f~rir~- of thc~ uth~~r firni an~l t;ivcn t,hc locations a and b) sub-
jc~r~t. to I,hc conclit.ion t.hat. thc, indilfr~rcnt contiurncr lic~s in I,hc i`~` intcrval, i.c~.
i G a~(u,b, y~r, p1) G i. f I. I~or firni I this yíc~lds pricc 1~r(c~~h,Pz) givcn by
p2~{-(h-a)(afb-2i) ifp2Ga
1~i(a, 6,P2) - ~~- (b - a)(af2
z; ~ dD~-) if cY C pz C~~ 4(6 - a) (2)
~2-1-(b-a)(a~b-2i-2) ifp2)af4(b-a)
wit,h a- 2(6 - a)(i - z~ á~), and for firm 2 this yields price p2(a, b, pr )
given by
~i f (b - a)(2i f 2- a- b) if pi c,li
P2(a,b,T~,)- ~-~(b-a)(~`-z e f á) if~iCpr GQ-~9(b-a) (3)
pi ~- (6 - a)(2i - a - b) if pi ) Q-}- 4(b - a)
with ~ - 2(b - a)(-i - 2 -F a~ ~- ~).
I~roni f hc pricc~ schenu~s givcn by c~yuations ( 2) and ( 3) wc can dcterrninc t.hc
c~c~uilibriutn price schernes for every a and b. '1'here only exists a Nash equi-
librium in locations however when prices are given by the interior solutions,
i.e.
Pi(a,b,P2)-~~(b-a)(a 2-z~~d~)t~
Pz(a~ b, Pi ) - ~ f (b - a)( ~'-a-b ~ ~).2 2 d,f~
'1'herefore, given o and h the equilibrium price schemes are given by
~1 (ae b~ - ( 63a ~(a ~ b - 22 }






undcr t.hc~ restriction thaL cr C pz(a, b) C a f h(6 - a) and ~i G Pz(a, b) G
~3~4(b-a), which is the same as requiring that i C x(a, b, pr(a, b), p2(a, b)) G
i -1- I. - -
When a and b are such that i G~(a, b, p, (a, b), p2(a, b)) C i-~ 1 the second
order conditions guarant,ee a maximum but for z(a, b, pr (a, b), p2(a, b)) - i
and a(a,b, p,(a, 6), p2(a, b)) - i~ I the second derivative is equal to zero. We
corne back to this later. I~rom (I) and (4) we see that ~(a, b, pr(a, b), pZ(a, b))
equals
x(a, 6) - 6{ a-f- b -}- 4i ~
2~ 4D` ~ (5)
l ~tr 1J
'I'he condition i C~(a, b) C i~- 1 can be written then as
2i,-~4D`-2 ~a~bC2i-Fg~4D;-2
(6)
d~f, - - d:fr
The next step is to determine thc optimal locations, given the equilibriurn
price schemes írom equation (4) and given thc location of t,he other firm.
1~'irm 1 thus maximizes IIi (a, b) - II~ ( a, b, pr ( a, 6), p2(a, b)) with respect to a
subjec.t to condition (6). From
II~ (a, 6) -~(
b- a)(a ~ b- 2i }
2 f 2D; )l {D; ~- d;ft(~(a, b) - i)}3 d;~, J
wc get.
áII' (a b) - d 2-~ 2D, 2 f 2D;l
aa' -18r
a f b- 2i ~- d 3a - b- 2i f d }. (7)
~ti ~ti JJJ
'1'he first t.errn of thc~ rightha,nd side of (7) is of course st,rictly negative.
'I'hc scc~ond I,crm is sl,rictly positivc hc~causc according to (fi) iL holds that
a-f- b- 2i ~- (2 ~ 2D;)~d;f, - a f b-'Li f(2 - 4D;)~d;~, ~ 6D;~di}1 ~
6D;~d;}z ~ 0, with both equality signs for x(a, b) - i- 0. However a and
b rnust he such t,hat x(a, h) will be greater t,han zero in equilibrium because
hot.h firrns have Lo be in the rnarket,. 'I'he third term is zero for
a-3{bf2i-2~2D;1l ,fr J (g)
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IL ran be verificd that the second order conditions for a maxinnim are satis-
fied. With condition ( 6) we get t.hat, firm I's profit maximizing location a(h)
is given by
,d,}, - h if h G -y
a(h)- j(fif2i.-~d'}~) ifyGbGy-~2t
2i~~D'-2-b~6 if6~7~2f
wit,h y- i f r~a~-~.n,t, f,
I~ irrn l rnaximizes fIz(a, 6) - IIz(a, b, pt (a, b), pz(a, b)) with respect to b sub-
jcct, to condition (6). From




a~6-2i- ~d 2D~~~a-3b-F2i-F 4d 2D~~ (10)
,f i ttr 11
'I'he first tcrrn of thc righttrand side of (10) is strictly rregative. 'l~he sec.ond
term is also strictly negative because according to conditíon (6) it holds that
a f b - 2i - (~ - 2D,)~d;tr - a -}- b - 2i ~ (`L - 4D,)~d;~r ~ (6D; - 6)~d,~r G
fi -~ (Ei"P, -(i)~d,ti G 0, with bot.h cyuality sigus for x(a,b) - i~ 1 - re.
I luwt~~~t~r, .r(n, b) ~~.ill hc~ snr~t.llc,r t lian n in r~quilibrium bccausc bot,h firrns
li:r-vi~ to It~~ in tlii~ nra.rkc~l.. 'I'lu~ f.liir~l Lc~rnr is zcro for
b-3~af2if~d2D`~ (11)
~tr
Again t,he second order conditions guarantee a rnaximum. Combination with
condition (G) yields that firm 2's profit rnaximizing location b(a) is given by
2i~4D';2-a ifaGaf




with ó- i-~ r Á~;} ro
1''rom the react.ion functions (J) and (12) it can be showo that there are
different types of location equilibria, determined by the demand distribution.
If a' and b' are such that a` - a(b'), b' - 6(a') and letting ~' - x(a',b') we
get t.he following. Whenever D; ~ 2 or D;~r C 2 then either firm 1's location
or firm 2's location is restricted. If D; 1 2 then a' - i~ ~D~}A, b' - i-~ r1D'-4
i sr i~D.-r~ ~:r ~ l~~f~ anda.nd .r` - i.. If D;~~ C Í thc~n a.' - r. ~ z~ ad,t, ~ b' - z z ~d,~,
.r' - i~- 1. In both cases we get corner solutions and the corresponding
cquilibria are referred to as restricted equilibria. It is obvious that these
equilibria cannot be a global equilibrium for the overall game.
If i is such 1,hat both D; C i and D;~i ) z then we get an unrestricted
cquilihriurn givcn hy cyuat,ions (8) and (11)~'1'his yields
a` - i - ~tay,Ad.{i
(13)
b' - i -} 5-9D' .4d,~,
Substitution of (13) into (4) gives the equilibrium prices
d (14)Pi - Pz - 22d;~,
with ~~ - p~(a',b') ancí pi - p2(a',h'), and substitution of (13) into (5)





Note that condition ( 6) indeed is satisfied for a' and 6' given by (13) because
D; C i ancl D;~i ~?.
Corollary 3.1 l,e.t i be. such thal 0 C(1 - 2D;)~2d;~r C 1. Then the equi-
librium outcome for the game I" consists of location choices a' - i-(1 -~
4D;)~4d;~r and b' - i-}-(5-4D;)~4d;~r and price choices pi - p2 - 3~2d;}r.
10
Proof'I'his follows irnrnediately frorn Definition 2.1 and equations (13) and
(14).
'I'hc following Icninia statcs whaL thc cquilibriurn profits arc.
Lemma 3.2 Let i be such lhat 0 G(1 - 2D;)~2di}1 G 1. The equilibriurrt
locations and prices in the ,yame I'' are such that both firms face the sarne
demaTad. Furthermore both firm.s use the same price, policies and the proftt of
fàr.m ~- is given by IIk - IIk(a', b', pi, ps) - 3~(4d;~r) tlk E{ 1, 2}.
Proof Using ( 15) we can write Di (a', h', p„ p2) - D; -}- d;~r(x' - i) - D~ f
( I ~2 - D; )- 1 ~2. I'rom ( 1 ~) we know furthermore that the firms use thc
same price policies, p~ - pi - 3~'ld;~i. 1'rofits are given then by II~' - TI2' -
3~~cf;~i with 1[k - Ifk(a',h',pi,7ri) t1k' E{1,2}.
Thus the two firms always charge the sarne price in equilibrium and fur-
t,hcrrnurc hoth firrns will havc diffcrent, locat,ions in cyuilibriurn. 'I'his mcans
I,ha.l, thc trrin~~.il~lc of minirnirrn diffcrcnl,iation no longcr holds. Notc that
thcsc resull,s arc cquivaJcnf, t,o t,hc resull,s Lcdcrcr and Ilurtcr ( 198fi) found
for I,he situation of discrirninatory pricing.
Next we need to verify what happens when x' - i or x' - i-}- I. To
check whether profits are indeed maximized at the corner solutions x' - i or
x' - i~ 1 we need to compare the profits achievable in the interval at the
left to t,he cornc~r solution and the profit,s achievable in the interval at the
right. to the cornc~r solution. SupFrose that :r' - i. Then x' is either in t,he
(i - l)`h or in t.hc i`h interval, i.c. i- 1 C x' G i or i C x` G i f 1. `I'here is
a rnaximum for x' in the i`h interval if and only if for both firms profits are
higher than for x' in the ( i - 1)`h interval and there is a maximum for x' in
the (i - 1)`h interval if the opposite holds. I:rom Lemrna 3.2 we see that there
cannot be a situation where one of the firms has maximum profits íor x' in
the (i - 1)`h intcrval whereas the other firrn has maximum profits for x' ín
the i`h interval. It is easy to see that IIk 1 TI~ r' is equivalent to d;~r G d;
and II~ G IIk`-rl' is equivalent to di}1 ~ d; ~!k E {1,2}. So if x' - i the first
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ordcr conditions givc maximum profits, no matter what, d; and d;~t exact,ly
arc,. 1~'or :r` - i~ 1 1,herc are a,gain t,wo possibilit,ies and the result is the
~ante.
'1he existence of an unrestricted LLPE for the game I'' is determined
completely by the demand distribution. 'I'he condition 0 C(1-2D;)~2d;tt C
1 can be rewritten as D; C 1~2 and Di}1 ) 1~2. Moreover we know that D;
and D;ft cannot both be equal to 1 ~2 because of d;~r ] 0 b~i E{0, ..., n-1 }.
lt is obvious that there will only be an unrestricted LLPE for I'` if i satisfies
very stringent conditions.
ln thc following lcmrna wc prove t,ha,t~ t,hcre exists an tmrestricted LLPE
for at least onc z E{0, .. , n- 1}.
Lemtna 3.3 For each denaarad dislribution G dr, d2, . .., d„ ) with n E N
llacre ~is al lecisl arte 1" wi.lh i E {0, ..., re- 1} for~ ~mlticle an unreslricled GGl'l;
e~isls.
Proof We prove this by cont,radiction using an induction argurnent. Let V;
be defined as {0, ..., i} wit,h í G n- 1 and i E N. Suppose that there is
no tmrestricted LLPE for I'' with i E Vo. From Corollary 3.l we know that
t,hc condit,ion 0 C (1 - 2D;)~2d;~i G 1 docsn't hold for i- 0 then. With
Dc~ - 0 this can be rewritten as 0 G 1 ~2d, C 1. Clearly 0 G 1~2d, always
holds, Lherefore it, must be that, 1 ~2dt ~ 1 or eyuivalently dt G 1 ~2. Next we
suppose that there is no unrestricted LLPI; for any I'` with i E Vt. If there
is no unrestricted LLPE for I't then the condition 0 C(1 - 2D~)~2d2 G 1
doesn't hold. Because t,here is no unrestrict,ed LLPE for Po we furthermore
know t.hat. dt G 1 ~2. 13ut thcn t,hc condition simplifies Lo 1-`ldi C 2d~. 1~'or
this condil,ion not to hold it must be that di -}- dZ G 1~`l. 13y induction we
see that there is no unrestricted LLPE for any I'` with i E Vn-r if and only if
dt ~- d2 -} ..-~- dn G 1~2 which contradicts dt f dl -}- -..~ dn - 1. Therefore
there exists an unrestricted LLPE for sorne I'' with i E {0, ..., n- 1}.
As was noted before the local location-price equilibrium concept is very
strong and the yuestion ariscs if thcre is possibly a uniquc unrestrictcd LI,PP',,
i.e. whether or not there is only one value of i for which there exists an
unrest,ricted LLPE for I''. If there is a unique unrestricted LLPE for I'' this
is necessarily t,he unique GLPE for I'.
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Lemma 3.4 hnr ea.r,h rlcrrtanrl dislribution G dr, d2, . .., d„ 1 witia n E J`í
lhr rr arr~ rtt r~r.nsf, twu I'' ~~aillr. i E {0, ..., re - 1} for iahich are unrestricled
l,l,l'Is r.xist,s. lf thr.re cfist.5 atz ntcreslriracd LhPlS Jor I" and I'~ wilh i, j E
{0, ..., n. - I} and i. G j lhrn. n.rvrss~arily .7 - i~ I.
Yroof ln Lcrnrna 3.:3 wc proved that therc always exists an uurestricted
LLPE. So there exists an i such that there is an unrestricted LLPE for
sonx~ 1'`. l~s wc have secn this is equivalent to requiring that, D; G 1~2
~rnd ~D,~i 7 l~'L. Now supposc I,hat Lhcrc~ also exists a j~ i ~wil,hout
loss of gcncralit.v) suclr lhat, thcrc cxists an unrestrictcd I,LPI~ for 1'~, thus
D; G 1~2 and D;.r.~ 1 1~2. F~ut, thcn D;~r ) 1~2 1 D; 1 D;t~ ) 1~2
which rneans that D;~r must bc equal to 1~2 and j be equal to i~- 1~ It is
c~asv to scc~ that, thc~rc arc at, most, two cquilibria. Suppose t,o thc contrary
I,ha~l, there exists a I,hird cquilibriwn for say I'n` with na 7 j t,hen we get
D„i ~ D;~r - D; -~ d;tr ) 1 ~2 f d;tr 1 1 ~2 while D,,, G 1~2 is required.
a
I~rorn this lernrna ib is clcar t,hat, there can be only t,wo unrestricted LLPEs
whc~n I,hc~ dcrnand disi,rihution is such that, for somc i it holds that, D; - I ~2.
13u1, above we have seen that when ;c' is a corner solution then on one of the
int,ervals of which x" is an endpoint, the equilibrium outcome is dominating
unless the demand is equally distributed on both intervals. This leads to the
following corollary.
Corollary 3.5 !'or each demand distribution G dr, d2i ..., d,n 1 with n E
.JV there exists a unique unrestricted LLPE, i.e. there exists exactly one
i E {0, ..., n- 1} for which an. unrestricted LLPE for I'` exists, whenever
D; ~ 1 ~2. Otherwise there is an itnre.strir.ted LI,PE for both I'`-r and I''.
If there are two unrestricted LLPEs, one for I'`-r and one for I'', then
Lemma 3.2 says that profits are equal whenever d; - d;~r. In case d; G d;fr
t.hen the unrestricted LLI'F, for I''-r yields higher profits for both firms and
in case d; 1 d;~r then the unrestricted LLPE for I" yields higher profits for
both firms. This leads to our main result.
Theorem 3.6 hor cach dernand distribut ion G dr , d2i ..., d„ ) with n E JV
thcrc exists a unique GI,PI~;.
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Proof First, we consider the case for which there is a unique unrestricted
hLPI;. Let, i' E{0, ..., n- 1} be the value of i for which the unrestricted
LLPL for 1'` exists and denote this equilibrium by G a`, b', pr(a, b), p2(a, b) ).
Of course the conditions for G a', b', p~ (a, b), p2(a, 6) ) to bc a GLPE are
satis(icd I,hcn. Ncxt we consider t,he case for which thcre is not a unique
unrestrictcd l.l,l'1~;. In this situation Lhere are two subseyuenL values of i
such t,hat thcre cxists an unrestrictcd LLPE for I", say for i- i' - 1 and
for i- i'. If d;. ~ d;.ti then there is a unique value of i for which profits
for both firms are rnaximized. Ot,herwise for both values of i profits are
maximized. We have to show now that the location and price choices are
identical for i- i' - 1 and for i- i'. We will only do this for firm 1, for
firrn 2 the procedure is analogous. I~'or i- i' we get from (13) that a' -
i'-(1 f4D;.)~4d;.t, - i'-(k f4D~.-~ }4d,.)~4d;. - i"-I -(1 ~4D;.-~)~4d;.,
which is also thc opt.irnal location of firrn l for i- i' - 1. I~'urthermore we
see that p~(a,b) - 1~3(h-a)(a { h-2i' ~-(2~-2D;.~d;.t~) - 1~3(b-a)(a~-
b- 2(i.` - l) f (2 f 2D;.-r~d;.) and analoguosly for pz(a, b).
4 Properties of location-price equilibria
In this sec.t,ion we will discuss sorne basic properties of location-price equi-
libria. These are mainly properties relat,ed to the degree of differentiation
(Lhc distance bctwcen Lhe Lwo firms). 1~'irst we relate Lhe dcgrce of di(fer-
ent,iation in a situation of uniforrnly distributed consurncrs to a situation of
non-uniforrnly cíistributed consurncrs.
Lemma 4.1 Let G a', 6',pr(a, b), p2(a, b) ~ be an unrestricted LLPE for
I''. If d;~t ~ l~n then b' - a' G 3n~2 and if d;~r G l~n lhen b' - a' 1
3n~2. In particular if the consumers are, distributed uniformly (i.e. d; - l~n
Vi E{0, ..., n- 1}~ then 6" - a` - 3n~2. Furthermore in lhe uniform case
a' - -n~4 and b' - 5n~4.
Proof 13ecausc C a', h', p~ ( a, b), pz(a, b) ) is an unrestrictcd hLPI: for I„
we know that a` and b' are given by equation ( 13). But then we can write
b' - a' - i f(5- 4D;)~4d;~r -(i -(1 ~-4D;)~4d;~r) - 3~2d;tr. If d; fr 1 l~n
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thcn G' -a` C:3~Zn and if d;tr G I~n then b" -a` ~ 3~2n. So for d;t~ - l~n
the equalit,y sign holds. In the uniforrn case D; can be written as D; - i~n.
Substitution in ( 1:3) yielcís a' - i-( l f4D,)~hd;~r - i-(1 -}-4(i~n))~(4~n) -
-n~4 and h' - i }- (5 - ~1D;)~4d,~r - i f (5 - 4(z~n))~(4~n) - 5n~4.
~I'his lrarnma says t~hat the degrce of differentiation ouly depends on the
dernand distribution. If dernand is concentrated in the centre for example
both firrns will locate nearer to the centre. If demand is concentrated at the
endpoints both firms will locate further away from the cent,re. In the uniform
case we.~ see that, it is optimal for both firrns to locatf: outside the city, rnore
precisely at a dist.ance of n~4 from the endpoints.
Lemma 4.2 L,et G a', h`, pr (a, b), p2(a, b) ) be an unrestricted LLPF, for I'`.
7'hr~n iG holds fhat a` G i G~` G i f 1 c b", i.e. the indi,fjerent consumer is
located to the rzgh.t of fir~n, 1 and to the left of fir~n 2.
Proof Frorn Corollary 3.1 it follows immediately that a' G i because both
D; and d;~r are non-negative. Remains t,o be proved that i f 1 G 6'. The
ot.hr~r inequalities hold per definit.ion. R.ewriting 6` - i~ (5 - 4D;)~4d;fr as
h' - i~ 1 -~ (5 - 1D; - ~d;.~r )~Ad;tr - i~- 1-f (5 - 4D;~i ) f 4d;~r shows that
b" 1 í~ I hccausc ~i -~SD,~r is non-negat,ive.
O
'1'his lcmma formalizes Smithics' ( I9~ 1) notions of "competel,ive region"
for the rcgion [a',b`] and of "hinterlands" for t,he region (-oo, a'] and [b`, oo)
wi1.h respcr~l, to r~il.hcr of t.hc~ t,wo (irrns. lt is ohvious that thc siu. of thc corn-
pr,tcl,ivc, rc~~ion rlr~trr~nrls r rur ially oii thc~ dcnrand clistrihntion. Nc~vr~rl,hclrss
I,lic~ rlcrn~rnrl dispr~rsal is irrc~lcvant, for thc sizc of thc rnarkct arcas of thc firnia
as wc saw in Lc~nrna 3.2. !1 natural conscyucnce is that ihcir rnarket arc~as
arc eqiral if thc consumers are distributed symmetrically along the line.
Corollary 4.3 The ,.carcie for the CI,PI; for I', ís r.quivalent to searching an
i for irhich D; C 1 ~2 C D;t ~. Searr.h,in,g iteratively from i- 0 to i- n- 1
lrnrGy !n a irnryrrr r~al7tr i` for í rr~h.rncvrr d;. ~ d;.tr in casc D;. - 1~2.
Ollrrrmisr !hr'rr i.c ara i~' s~zcch lhat both. i - i' - 1 and i - i' satisfy lhc
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condition D; G 1~2 G D;~,. For both i - i' - 1 and i- i` the equilibrium
localions are a' - i-(1 f 4D;)~~d;t, and b' - i~(5 - 4D;)~4d;~, and the
ey~uilibriurn prices are p~ -~1 - 3~2d~~~.
Proof '1'his follows irnrncdiately frorn Corollary 3.1 and Corollary 3.5.
O
'Phis corollary is very helpful in deterrnining the eyuilibria for the two
stage location-then-price game. Once we have found an i, starting from zero,
for which D; G 1~2 G D;~, we know the GLPh~.
Example 4.4
We will illustrate Lhe search for the equilibria of the Lwo-stage location-
then-price garne for the situation where n- 3. The demand distribution is
given then by G d,, d2i d3 ~ with d; ) 0 t1i E { 1, 2, 3}. Corollary 3.1 says
that there is an unrestricted LLPE for the game I'' whenever the condit,ion
0 G (1 - 2D;)~2d;t, G 1 holds. Writing out this condition for i - 0 yields
Do G 1 ~2, d, 1 0 and d, 1(1 ~2)(1 - 2Do). For i- 1 this yields D, G 1 ~2,
d2 1 0 and d2 ~(1~2)(1 - 2D,). For i - 2 this yields DZ G 1~2, d3 1 0 and
d3 )(1~2)(1 - 2D2). Substituting Do - 0, d3 - 1- d, - d2i D, - d, and
D2 - d, -~ d2 sirnplifies the conditions to d, ~ 1~2 for i- 0, d, G 1~2 and
d, f d2 ~ 1~2 for i- 1 and d, ~ d2 C 1~2 for i- 2. In figure 1 we see that
there are at most two equilibria. It is furthermore obvious that there is a
unique equilibrium for all demand distributions G d,, d2i d3 ) with d, ~ 1~2
and d, -{- d2 ~ 1~2.
First we consider the situation where demand is distributed uniformly, i.e.
G d,,dZ,d3 ) equals G 1~3, 1~3, 1~3 ). 'I'hen there is a unique unrestricted
LLPE for i- 1. In equilibrium it holds that a' - -3~4, b' - 15~4 and
pi - p2 - 27~2 according to Corollary 3.L h'rom (15) we see that x' equals
3~2 so equilibrium profits are II~' - CIZ' - 27~4.
Next we consider a situation where demand is concentrated near the cen-
tra Lct. G d, , d1i d;; 1 bc cqual to G 1 ~5, 3~5, 1 ~5 1 for cxarnple. Again
there is a unique unrest,ricted hLI'1? for i- L In equilibriurn it holcís that
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Figure 1: Equilibria for n- 3
5 Equilibrium solutions for restricted firms
As Horstmann and Slivinsky (1985) argued the most important feature of the
line segment representation is not its linearity but the fact that it posseses
endpoints. Due to these endpoints the set of possible solutions is smaller
and the search for equilibria should be easier. Nevertheless, as noted before,
the equilibrium characterization becomes more difficult because the best re-
sponses of the firrns now also depend on the restrictions on their locations.
The idea of restricting firms' locations comes from geograhic considera-
tions at the one hand and from the anology with restrictions on the con-
sumers' willingness to pay on the other hand. In a situation of inelastic
demand firms have a smaller incentive to differentiate (horizontally) because
the probability that demand declines increases. Due to this fact the. firrns
will not choose locations Lhat are further t,han some arbitrary lower bound
or upper bouncí.
In this section we study the sarne problem as before, but now with the
additional constraints t,hat n 1 a and 6 G b with a a lower bound on firrn
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1's location choice and b an upper bound on firm 2's location choice. We
assume that a G 6. In particular we are interested in the effects on the
equilibrium locations that we have found before. Tirole (1988) shows that
the outcome for the uniform case is given by a` - 0 and b" - n when a- 0
and b- n. Recall from Lemma 4.1 that t,he result for the unrestricted case
was a' - -nJ4 and b' - 5nJ4.
T~'or t,he restricted case we see t,hat the third terrn in (10) is positive for
a~ 2i -} (4 - 2D;)Jd;~~ ) 3h and t,haL the third term in (7) is negative for
L~'~i -(2 ~ 2D;)Jd;t~ G 3a. Wc. dcnote 'l; - 2i -(`l ~- 2D;)Jd;~i anc}
S; - 2i f(4 - 2D;)Jd;~~. `I'he optimal location choices a(b) and b(a) can be
given then by
a(b) - ~ a
(b -~ 7,)J3
if b-F'l; c 3a
if b~-T; 1 3a (16)
and
6(a) - j(a
f S;)J3 if a-~ S; C 36
l b ifa~S;~3b. (17)
From equations (16) and (17) we can determine immediately the Nash
equilibriurn locations, which will be denoted by a" and b`".
Corollary 5.1 Lel i be s~ich that D; G 1 J2 G D;~~ and let a and b be ,yiven.
7'hr Na.tih rquilibriter~c irz luc~atiore.5 i.s~ yivcri. lhcn b,y
1. a"-aandb"-bij 7;C3a-bandS;l3b-a;
2. a"" - a and b" -(a ~- S;)J3 if S; ~- 3T; G 8a and S; C 36 - a;
.3.a"-(6fT;)J3andb""-bif T;13a-band35;-~T;~86;
~. a"' -(.S; f 37', ) J8 and h" -(:I.S; ~ 7; ) J8 iJ S; f 37; 1 8a and 3S; ~- T;
G 8h. -
'1'he equilibriurn c.haract,erizat,ion is analogous to thc unrestricted case and
we do not discuss that in detaiL E~or each situation in Corollary 5.1 the equi-
librium prices pi" - pi(a"`, b") and p2' - p2(a",b") can be calculated from
equation (4) a.nd t,he indifferent consumer x" - x(a`", b") can be calculated
from (5).
l8
!`ti .~.~i illnstr.,.l,iun wc hricfly luok al, i.hc situation whcrc n- 2, a- 0
and b- l. '1'his means thaL (irrns are noL allowed to locate outside the
city. h'irst we look at the game I'o. With To - -2~d, and .So - 9~d, we
see after some calculation that a" - 0 and b" - 2 if 1~2 G d, G 2~3 and
a" - 0 and b"' - 4~3d, if 2~3 G d, G I. Next we look at the game 1''.
With T, --4d,~(1 - d,) and 5', - (6 - 9d,)~(1 - d,) we sce t.hat a" - 0
and b"' - 2 if 1~3 G d, G 1~2 and a" - 2- 4~3(1 - d,) and b" -`l iC
Ocd, c 1~3. - -
ln figurc 2 thc optinral location choiccs as a Cunction of Lhc pararnetcr
cl, ar~~ depict,ecí for bot.h ihe rest ricted case with a - 0 and b- 2 and the





























We sec that. both firms adjust thcir strategy when there are restrictions on
thcir loc:al,ions. If one of thc firrns is rest,ricted the other firrn rnoves furl,her
away in order to avoid strong price cornpet,ition. Nevert,heless rest,rict,ions on
Llic, (inns' locat.ions will always resnll, in a lowcr dcgrcc~ of diffcrenl.ial,ion.
nlt.liuiit;h yuir niight argnc Lha.L (irnrs bcing restrictcd in Lhc~ir local.iun
choice will have lower prolit,s bec.ause I,hey are more restrained t,o competition
and therefore have smaller "hinterlands", the above results show that the
opposite effect, i.e. the other firm moves further away in ordcr to avoid
competit,ion, will be dominating if the dernand dispersal is large enough.
6 Some concluding remarks
This paper describcs how the problc~m of maxirnizing non-quasi concave. profit
Functions in two-stagc spat.ial location modcls can be solved analyt,ically. Thc
a.dva,ntagc of t,his is Lhat. wc~ do not, ncrd to nrake (vcry) strong assumpt.ion5
wit.h respcct to the dernand function and we need not to Lurn to sirnulative
t,echniques, which ensures that the impact of demand dispersals can be traced
explicit,ly.
I;clriilihriunn c~ha.vior sccrns Lo hc dcl.crrnincd conrplct,cly by t,hc dcrna,ncl
dititribut,ion. 'I'liiti resulLs Lo a'fiLrl'' solut,ion, i.c. bot,h firrns sr.l, c~qual priccs
and face the same demand. In other words, none of the firms is worse of by
being labeled firm 1 or firm 2.
To test our analytical results wc did some numerical calculations using the
well known Newton-Raphson method (sec Webers and Webers (1993)). `I'he
resrilts confirmed our thoughts that, our (sirnple) analytical result,s arc very
useful for people who have t,o do the same type of calculations, because this
numerical method is very tirne consuming in a situation of strong demand
dispersals (ancí is strongly dcpcndcnt, on thc starting valucs).
The ficlds of interests that corne from this analysis are thc following. ~1n
important. step is to extend the analysis to a two-dimensional space while
allowing for more than two firms. Furthermore we feel the need to weaken
the assurnption of an infinite willingness to pay. In Webers (19936) a first
a.ttcrnpt, in this direction is rnade by showing the effects of a finite willingness
to pay in a situation of uniformly distributed consumers. `I'hese results need
to be generalized for the case of non-uniformly distribrrted consumers, before
being implemented in the two-dimensional framework.
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